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Accountability and rural development partnerships 
A study of Objective 5b EAGGF funding in South West England 
 
Abstract 
 
Funding for Rural Development Partnerships has signalled a shift in rural 
policy, towards actively involving the rural population in determining the 
direction and implementation of change. However, early experience with 
partnerships has indicated that the funding bodies have retained significant 
control. One reason for this is that they are constrained by their 
accountability requirements. Furthermore, with not all members of the 
partnership accountable to the same degree, the funding bodies bear a 
significant proportion of the risk of new ventures which can result in 
conservative decisions. A study of the EAGGF component of an EU 
Objective 5b Programme in the South West of England highlights the 
tensions that can arise in a partnership from existing accounting 
arrangements. The lack of a trusting relationship between state and citizens 
resulted in excessively formal accountability requirements, creating 
difficulties for applicants, and producing risk-averse decisions by state 
administrative bodies. However, the case study demonstrates that through 
the development of networks, both accountability and thereby project 
responsibility and risk could be more widely spread, creating opportunities 
for locally shaped, novel and flexible development. 
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Introduction 
When the rhetoric of partnerships entered the rural policy domain, there was an 
expectation that this would result in greater autonomy for those for whom the policies 
were intended to benefit. There was a presumption that partnerships would be a means by 
which the state would relinquish some of its responsibilities to private and voluntary 
sector actors (Edwards et al., 2001). In practice, this does not appear to have occurred to 
the degree expected. Many commentators, focusing on specific examples of rural 
partnerships, have suggested that there has been little change in the power relationships, 
with the state maintaining a high degree of control on the pattern of development (see for 
example Murdoch and Abram, 1998, Jones and Little, 1999, Storey, 1999).  This has led 
Edwards et al. (2001) to argue that the partnership approach merely marks a shift in the 
strategy of the state to render society governable, rather than marking a change in 
governance. The same authors conclude that a reason why power has not been transferred 
away from the state is because partnerships have no direct accountability to the public. 
This is a subject worthy of further discussion. Critical accounting studies have identified 
how accounting techniques determine our means of perceiving and acting upon events 
and processes (see for example, Roberts (1991), Hopwood and Miller (1994), Munro and 
Mouritsen (1996)). Consequently, the forms of accountability that are construed in social 
arrangements do have a direct bearing on their nature and function. Therefore, in this 
paper we focus on the accountability arrangements for the allocation of EAGGF funding 
in the Objective 5b programme area in the South West of England and consider how this 
influenced the funding and development process.  
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The Objective 5b funding programme was an EU spatially designated rural development 
programme which operated between 1989 - 1999. In the first Objective 5b programming 
period (1989-1993), the South West England area designation (covering parts of Devon 
and Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly) was one of just four designations within the UK. For 
the second programming period (1994-1999) the number of Objective 5b areas was 
increased to 11 and the South West England designation was enlarged to cover all of 
Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, greater proportions of Devon, and West Somerset. In 
terms of funding allocated, it became the largest designation in the UK. It was in the 
second programming period that funding from the Guidance section of the agricultural 
budget (EAGGF) first became available in conjunction with funding from ERDF and ESF 
monies. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)
1
 was responsible for 
administering the EAGGF funding in the Objective 5b areas and the experience marked 
MAFF's initial involvement in a territorially-designated partnership-designed rural 
development programme.  
 
Objective 5b areas originated from the 1988 reforms of the EU Structural Funds which 
followed the 1987 Single European Act. The impetus for reform arose from concern that 
regional disparities throughout the EU could increase with the creation of the internal 
market. At the same time the need to confront rural problems was recognised, with CAP 
reform, the increasing number (through enlargement) of less developed rural areas within 
the EU, and growing environmental pressures on rural areas. (For further details see 
Midmore (1998), Ward and McNicholas (1998a, 1998b)). Accordingly, the promotion of 
rural development became one of the six defined objectives in the reformed Structural 
 5 
Funds programmes. There was both a sector designation (Objective 5a) aimed at speeding 
up the adjustment of agricultural structures in all areas, and a spatial designation 
(Objective 5b) targeted at particularly fragile rural economies in specific areas.
2
  
 
Although Objective 5b was an EU initiative, as with all other Structural Funds, it was co-
financed by Member State governments. Furthermore, since a specific aim of the 
programme was that it should be non-formulaic, with individual and appropriate solutions 
developed for each area, involvement of local government was also required. Hence, a 
partnership approach between the various bodies was essential. Initially, following the 
1988 reforms, the partnership was considered to exist solely between officials in the EU, 
national and local governments. By 1993, for the second programming period when the 
concept of participatory development was gaining currency, the partnership principle was 
extended to include other 'competent authorities and bodies' as determined by the relevant 
Member State. Notably, the expressed emphasis on community participation was not as 
great as for the LEADER (Liaisons Entre Actions de Developement de l‟Economie 
Rurale) programme established in 1991. Nonetheless, the degree of participation required 
in the Objective 5b programme was subject to interpretation, and consequently varied 
throughout Europe (Lowe et al., 1998).  
 
The paper continues by first considering the concepts of accountability which are relevant 
to rural development programmes. Following, a chronicle of the funding allocation 
experience in South West England Objective 5b designation provides the basis for a 
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discussion on the influence of accountability demands on the rural development funding 
process.    
 
2. Accounting for actions    
 
Accountability, in some form, is a feature of all social relations. We give accounts of 
ourselves to justify our actions and attitudes, and to demonstrate our social competence. 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1996). Although, or because, accountability is a pervasive feature 
of human life, it is an elusive concept (Day and Klein, 1987). It occurs in many diverse 
contexts, and a variety of accounting methods can be employed. Whatever the form, 
accounting is not a neutral device that simply reports; it exerts an influence on the way we 
understand our social reality and the choices that are open to us (Miller, 1994). Tetlock 
(1985) has described accountability processes as norm enforcement mechanisms while 
Munro (1996) holds that accountability is implicated in a massive power struggle. Thus 
developing a critical awareness of the accountability arrangements within the Objective 
5b programme is appropriate for understanding how this approach to rural development 
actually functions, and for contemplating how rural development partnerships might 
progress. 
 
Ray (2000) has specified one of the central controversies regarding accountability 
arrangements for EU rural development programmes, in a discussion of appropriate 
evaluation procedures. He identifies that there is tension between the requirements of a 
managerialist state for evaluations to be positivistic and quantitative, and the necessity for 
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participants to be involved in reflective qualitative evaluations as part of an ongoing 
learning experience. Ray's distinction parallels work in critical accounting. For example, 
Munro and Mouritsen (1996) provide a collection of research monographs which 
recognise that accounts can take the form of either a series of coded representations and 
records, often in the form of numbers, or can be in the figuration of stories or dialogues 
(p2). The academic base for the coded form is in managerial accounting, and in 
psychology and sociology for the qualitative form. Roberts (1991) discerns that the two 
forms of accounting reflect different ontologies. He refers to the quantitative form as 
hierarchical because it is used when agents are accountable to a superordinate. The 
superordinate determines the purpose of action, with other individuals being merely 
instrumental in achieving the goal. This can have an individualising effect, causing 
people to be preoccupied with the image of self as an object of use, and to be either 
indifferent to others or competing against them. This can be problematic when individual 
welfare ultimately depends on organised action (Argyris, 1990). By contrast, the 
accounting done by dialogue and explanation, which Roberts (1991) refers to as the 
socialising form, creates space for an exploration of self and self-purpose. Within this 
context, individuals have intrinsic, not merely instrumental value and develop an 
understanding of themselves as distinct but interrelated with others.  
 
The socialising form of accountability appears to be attuned to the values associated with 
a partnership approach to rural development, in so far as it encourages debate on the 
purposes of a development, and spurs a process based on co-operation. But socialising 
forms of accountability tend to be limited to local contexts as the conditions considered 
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necessary for open dialogue are repeated face-to-face interactions and equality of power 
(Roberts, 1991, p365). Such conditions provide the opportunity for the growth of 
understanding, and encourage the foundation of trust in individual judgement and 
behaviour. However, the EU rural development programmes involve principals 
transferring resources to agents. In principal/agent situations there is an asymmetry of 
power which is a hindrance to frank communication. Moreover, when there is a distance 
between participants, impeding face-to-face interchange, the opportunities for trust to 
develop are limited. It is under such circumstances that hierarchical forms of 
accountability are utilised, with standards set by the principal, the superordinate. Laughlin 
(1996) considers that the stringency of the accounting procedures and thereby the degree 
of control brought to bear by the principal on the agent, can vary particularly with respect 
to the level of trust between them. He suggests that with low levels of trust, the 
accountability relationship is more contractual in nature, with tightly defined information 
requirements and projected outcomes. Where there are relatively high levels of trust 
between the principal and agent, then expectations over conduct and information are less 
structured and defined. Laughlin (1996) describes this less formal set of accountability 
relationships as communal and associates it with Roberts (1991) definition of socialising 
accountability. However, although there are clear similarities between the communal and 
socialising definitions, with both associated with more qualitative accounting structures, 
Roberts constrains socialising forms to instances where there is equality of power. This is 
not likely to be the case in a principal and agent hierarchical arrangement. Nonetheless, 
within Laughlin's communal accountability arrangements, although the agent is working 
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to achieve the intention of the principal, there is some latitude in the means by which the 
end is achieved, and a qualitative approach to accounting is feasible.  
 
Notwithstanding the ontological foundations of the hierarchical forms of accountability 
(subordinates being instrumental to the requirements of others), such accounting 
procedures can be associated with effective organisation in achieving a specific task. 
However, their organisational strength, lying in clear objectives and well-defined roles for 
individuals, is dependent on a stable environment. When there is a complex environment 
and high levels of uncertainty, either about the appropriate end goal, or regarding the 
means of achieving the end,
3
 hierarchical arrangements are less effectual. 
 
Many governments have recognised that the operating environment for the provision of 
public sector services is complex, and consequently have devolved the management of 
provision, with significant reforms of the public sector over the last twenty years. 
Associated with the organisational change have been adjustments to accountability 
arrangements. In effect, process accountability requirements (whereby agents account for 
their method of provision) have become less contractual in nature. At the same time 
performance accountability requirements (accounting for end results) have become more 
contractual, with the ubiquitous setting of performance targets. This has led some 
commentators to suggest that the degree of central political direction over public 
bureaucracies has increased (Rhodes, 1996, Thomas, 1998). The UK government 
response to this accusation is that it is performance targets that make devolution 
politically permissible. Balls (2002) identifies the tension between the desire to devolve 
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flexibility and encourage local innovation. He notes that, often, it is government ministers 
at the centre who remain accountable to parliament and the public. He consequently 
argues that devolution of responsibility for local initiatives has to be matched by local 
accountability (typically, in the form of government set performance targets). The 
divergence of opinion on whether government has become more centralised or 
decentralised, would appear to relate to the fact that the means of provision have been 
devolved, but the ends have been more clearly specified by central government.  
 
Proponents of endogenous rural development hold that local people are in the best 
position to determine the form of development for their locality, and therefore should 
determine the ends. But it would appear that the extent to which responsibility to 
determine the form of development can be devolved is dependent upon the degree to 
which accountability for the outcomes also can be devolved. Distance between principal 
and agent, in the rural case between EU taxpayer and rural dweller, means that socialising 
forms of accountability are not easy to implement. Sometimes institutional arrangements 
can be established to bridge the distance between principal and agent and allow more 
socialising accountability arrangements. For example, for some government financed 
services (e.g. education and health) provided by professionals, there are relevant 
professional organisations which require individuals to be accountable to them, normally 
in a non-contractual form. That said, in recent years there has been some erosion in 
confidence and trust of professional status (particularly by governments), resulting in the 
more prevalent use of performance targets. The case for performance targets is considered 
to be particularly strong when there is more than one organisation involved in the 
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provision of a good or service. They have a role in setting common goals and in keeping a 
line of accountability threading through all the organisations and people involved. 
Nonetheless, problems can arise because performance measures are normally only 
surrogates for measuring the desired performance output (Vagneur and Peiperl, 2000) but 
they become influential in management, resulting in unintended effects (see for example 
Hopwood (1972)). 
 
The distance between principal and agent is greater for the EU structural programmes 
than for nationally funded public sector services, and not unexpectedly in the light of the 
above discussion, performance targets are considered an important accountability tool. 
Given the objective of the funds to generate economic prosperity, the primary target was 
set in terms of job creation. Consequently, the success of a programme was to be 
determined chiefly by the number of new jobs generated matched against a performance 
target of job creation, with some concern for environmental improvement also expressed. 
Such an approach has been subject to criticism. Ray (2000) debates whether conventional 
job creation is synonymous with development, and Midmore (1998) draws attention to 
the limited information available to evaluate rural development programmes in 
quantitative terms. For example, the job creative potential of a programme will be highly 
dependent upon the macroeconomic cycle. The time horizon, within which a programme 
evaluation takes place, can be too short to capture the full impact of the funds in tangible 
outputs. Both Midmore (1998) and Ray (2000) make the case for more qualitative 
approaches to evaluating the success of a programme.  
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While there are problems with job targets, they do at least have the merit of specifying 
output in a very general way, allowing partnerships to consider how such jobs might be 
created. Furthermore, the EU's insistence on locally planned regeneration programmes 
has at least begun to give people living in an economically depressed area greater 
involvement in the development process than hitherto. In the early days of Structural 
Fund programmes, this was not necessarily the case in practice. It has been argued that for 
the first programming period, EU funds were used by Member States to promote national 
objectives and that there was no significant shift in the balance of power from national 
government to the local level (see for example Pearce (2000)). Within the UK, Lloyd and 
Meegan (1996) argue that national government had a strong hand in steering the use of 
Structural Funds in urban areas. They record that there was a fissure between the EU and 
UK perspective on urban regeneration. While the EU was encouraging the establishment 
of partnerships to develop coherent locally planned regeneration schemes, the UK 
government wanted to focus on encouraging private sector investment on an individual 
business basis. Lloyd and Meegan contend that, within the UK, the programme areas 
were viewed merely as containers to draw down European money to spend on central 
government approved programmes.  
 
A recognition that not all Member States were fully compliant with the stated intention of 
an integrated programming approach for the use of funds, resulted in the Commission 
asking for more detailed information from Member State authorities in the area 
development plans in the second programming period for Structural Funds. The plans 
were to be submitted with all related applications for assistance, and together were 
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referred to as the Single Programming Document (SPD). With increased amounts of 
money being devoted to the Structural Funds programme, there was a greater incentive to 
ensure that the programmes were effective in achieving the EU's stated aim and mode of 
helping the depressed regions and promoting cohesion within the EU (Kearney, 1997). 
The more contractual accounting requirements placed on Member States for the second 
programming period reflect a lack of faith at the EU level in those implementing the 
policy to comply with the intended programme construct.  
 
The experience with the management of the Structural Funds in the first programming 
period effectively illustrates that when an element of mistrust is held by a group or an 
individual who has endowed resources to another, stricter accounts may be required to 
reassure the donor that the resources will be used for their intended purpose.  
 
 
3. The experience of funding allocation in the South West Objective 5b Programme  
 
The Objective 5b programme encouraged area specific approaches to tackling problems 
in rural areas. For each designated area a development plan setting out the intended use of 
funds had to be produced by a partnership and formally approved by the Commission 
before EU funding was released. Each partnership also had to have a monitoring 
committee to ensure that actual funding allocations kept to the original plan. The 
formation of the programming document allowed the EU to maintain some control on 
how the money was spent, but its main intent was to encourage an integrated approach to 
 14 
development in vulnerable areas. Preceding the 1988 reforms, the Structural Funds had 
been available on an individual project basis and a high degree of autonomy was given to 
Member States in deciding on the use of funding. The movement towards the 
programming approach therefore marked an increase in EU influence in promoting 
integrated development.  
 
There were two main dimensions to the distribution of funding. First was the formation of 
the Single Programming Document (SPD) which produced the framework within which 
funding could be allocated. Secondly, there was the administration and decision on 
applications. Each of these is considered in turn. 
 
The formation of the South West England Single Programming Document 
The purpose of the Single Programming Document (SPD) was to outline the economic 
and social problems in the designated area, and detail how the EU funds (ERDF, ESF and 
EAGGF) would be used, specifying targets where quantification was possible, with 
emphasis given to job creation. In addition the SPD had to include an assessment of the 
environmental situation in the region, an evaluation of the environmental impact of the 
programme strategy, and measures to ensure compliance with Community environmental 
rules. EU rules also specified that the SPD had to be drawn up by a consortium, 
composed of members not solely from central government but also regional bodies (Lowe 
et al., 1998). With overall responsibility for the document lying with the regional 
Government Office, the initial lead for drafting a plan was taken by local government 
officers from Cornwall County Council, soon coupled with their counterparts from Devon 
 15 
County Council. Progressively they were joined by another forty organisations. The 
Government Departments involved were the Department of Trade and Industry (which 
had led the original urban Structural Fund bids), the Department of the Environment 
(with experience of the Single Regeneration Budget) and MAFF (a newcomer to the 
process of integrated development). Drafting the SPD proved to be a lengthy exercise. In 
the South West it was a more inclusive process than in many other areas, but there was 
still a failure to get a significant amount of the private sector involvement because the 
time demands were high.  
 
The South West England SPD was submitted to the Commission in April 1993, but 
approval was not immediate. The major criticism was that the SPD reflected only a 
schedule of proposed projects rather than a coherent regional strategy (DoE, 1997). The 
UK government had got away with uncoordinated SPDs in the first programming period 
of the Structural Funds, but in the second programming round the Commission exerted its 
power and applied pressure for a more integrated approach to be developed. Consultants 
were brought in to revise and finalise the South West England SPD which, when finally 
approved, was considered by the Commission to be one of the best Objective 5b SPDs 
within the UK (CEC, 1999). However, the rewrite delayed the effective start of the 
programme, which instead of beginning in early 1994, eventually got underway in 
January 1995. The lag in the start date, caused by EU ex ante accountability requirements, 
led to frustration within the region. Nevertheless, the South West was no different from 
other Objective 5b areas of Europe in this respect; for similar reasons none managed to 
start before 1995 (CEC, 1999).  
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Five programme priorities were set within the South West England SPD. These were 
SME development, Agriculture, Tourism, Community Regeneration and Environment. 
The total amount of EU funding allocated to the South West region was 39.8 million 
ECUs, with matched funding of 41.1 million ECUs from central government, and 10.9 
million ECUs expected from the private sector. In sterling these values have varied over 
the programming period with currency fluctuations, but total EAGGF funding amounted 
to around £30 million.  
 
Table 1:  Percentage of EU funds allocated by Priority and by Fund 
Priority ERDF ESF EAGGF All EU 
Funds 
SME & Business Development  32.0 7.3 - 39.3 
Tourism 16.3 3.2 2.4 21.9 
Agriculture - 2.2 8.6 10.8 
Community Regeneration 11.6 0.9 0.4 12.9 
Environment 5.9 1.1 7.1 14.1 
(Technical Assistance) 0.5 0.25 0.25 1.0 
TOTAL 66.3 15.0 18.7 100 
 
 
Source: Single Programming Document, South West Region, 1994. 
 
Table 1 lists the planned allocation of funding according to priority and fund source. The 
agricultural priority was allocated 10.8% of all funding, mainly from the EAGGF. 
EAGGF funds were also to be used to meet other priority targets, in particular those for 
the Environment and so in total, EAGGF monies accounted for 18.7% of EU funding for 
the region.
4
 Integration between the spending of the three funds was envisaged with 
ERDF monies targeted at infrastructure, non-agricultural job creating investment, and 
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support for local development initiatives. The ESF monies were to be used largely for 
training, while in the case of the EAGGF, a variety of potential uses for money from the 
Fund were designated. Within the agricultural priority, EAGGF funding options were 
divided between those to be used for the adjustment of agricultural structures to raise 
agricultural productivity and those encouraging diversification.  
 
The administration of EAGGF applications  
The administration of the procedure for allocating the EAGGF funds was the 
responsibility of MAFF. MAFF devolved day-to-day management down to the Farm 
Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA), an executive agency created in 1997 to carry out 
work formerly done by the MAFF Land Use Planning Unit. Details on the process of 
dealing with applications for funding are given in Warren et al. (1999).  
 
While the introduction of EAGGF funding within the Objective 5b area was warmly 
welcomed, the initial experience of applicants for EAGGF funds led to acrimony. Bids 
for funding were invited from early 1995, and with the programme due to end in 
December 1999, there was a five-year period within which grants could be awarded. 
Eighteen months on, in June 1996, only 10% of EAGGF money had been committed. The 
slow rate of fund allocation raised concern among applicants, a concern that was not 
abated when by June 1997, mid way through the period, less than 30% of the EAGGF 
money had been allocated, to a total of 88 projects. There appeared to be no lack of 
demand for funding, but many project applications were rejected. Consequently an 
opinion grew within the region that MAFF were being purposely obstructive and that 
 18 
central government was reluctant to provide matched funding. The MEP for Cornwall and 
West Plymouth, Robin Teverson, took up the issue, and wrote a report (Teverson, 1997) 
advocating reform of the application procedure. In the same year an interim evaluation 
(DoE, 1997) was carried out for the whole of the South West Objective 5b programme in 
compliance with Structural Fund regulations. This confirmed that the percentage of funds 
allocated (as of March 1997) was lower for the EAGGF source, compared to ERDF and 
ESF sources. However, this was not a specific South West England issue; a similar 
situation existed in other UK Objective 5b areas (CEC, 1999). The interim evaluation 
report also recorded that there was more dissatisfaction with the application process for 
EAGGF funds than from the other funds. As a result, the Universities of Plymouth and 
Exeter were asked to investigate the operation of the EAGGF Structural Funds in the 
South West (Warren et al. 1999). This study revealed that applicants found the EAGGF 
funding system obstructive and secretive. "The basic rules of the game [started] a mystery 
and emerged over time", one applicant commented, whilst another noted that "They 
(FRCA) seemed unsure of how to handle this application…there were long silences in the 
application phase which were frustrating." The report found that there was a perception 
that administrators' attention to the fine detail of audit requirements was ill matched to the 
needs of the business community. However, the pedantic approach was not necessarily 
because of a determined effort by administrators to obstruct, but could have been a result 
of the inexperience of the administrators with this new process. This finding reinforces 
one of the arguments of this paper that excessive centralisation, symptomatic of a lack of 
trust between government and governed, not only hinders the efficient and effective 
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administration of the Structural Funds but also is not conducive to developing the wider, 
social accountability which is needed in community-led development. 
Differences in perception about the grant application form highlight the divergent 
perspectives on the process by applicants and administrators. Applicants thought the form 
to be very complicated (DoE, 1997) while the FRCA considered it to be very basic 
(Warren et al., 1999). Indeed it was very similar to the ERDF application form where no 
problems were apparent; the difficulty seems to have arisen because of differences in the 
typical user of the form. Generally, ERDF claims were made by large organisations 
whereas it was individual businesses or consortia of small businesses that typically 
submitted applications to the EAGGF. Farm businesses found that, by comparison with a 
normal MAFF form, it was significantly more complicated. A particularly challenging 
aspect of the application was the requirement for measurable and achievable targets, e.g. 
the number of jobs that were expected to be created. This had not been required for 
previous MAFF grant applications and was described as a 'culture shock' for the industry 
(Warren et al. 1999). To some extent this had been anticipated in the design of the 
scheme, with part of the funding used to establish a network of „facilitators‟. These were 
unique to the EAGGF fund, being self-employed individuals contracted to MAFF, to act 
as catalysts in designing projects, establishing consortia, and providing liaison between 
applicants, FRCA and MAFF. Not only the applicants, but also the FRCA were 
challenged, for they were required to demonstrate considerable judgement and discretion 
in evaluating applications, hence the slow time in processing the application. It may also 
have been the case that the fund administrators, lacking confidence that the SPD job 
targets could be reached (because so many factors were beyond their control), focused on 
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ensuring that the application process was conducted to the book. One observer of the 
funding process noted “…the staff of FRCA are still seen as very pedantic in their work 
of assessing applications. They are not willing to take any risks” (Warren et al. 1999).  
 
Some delay in the processing may also be explained by the need to check that the 
proposal did not contravene EU rules. With other grants being available to farmers 
through EAGGF, it was important to establish that there was no duplication of funding 
(DoE, 1997). In fact, the processing time does not appear to have been significantly 
longer than for the other funds (DoE, 1997) but the impatience may have been greater 
because many of the applications were for small sums and the applicants were small 
businesses. For them, the cost of making the application had not been inconsequential, 
and the delay had implications for their cash flow and strategic planning (Warren et al. 
1999). Whatever the reality, the impression frequently given was that MAFF was 
disinterested and did not want to help. As a consequence, applicants became 
disillusioned, with some abandoning their proposal. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
programming period, most funding had been allocated, and for this to have been achieved 
the process of grant allocation did speed up.  
 
Initial slowness in the funding distribution may have been due in part to insufficient staff 
being involved in facilitating and administering the procedures in the early stages 
(Warren et al. 1999). Those newly appointed to the task were learning their role. Some 
people in the region believed that the problem lay with the national government not being 
fully committed to the programme, and they detected an easing in the funding allocation 
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process with the change in government in May 1997. With hindsight, it seems unlikely 
that central government up to mid 1997 had been purposely trying to apply the brakes. 
The fact that the problem lay chiefly with the EAGGF allocation and not ERDF or ESF, 
suggests that the impediment lay within MAFF rather than in a deliberate attempt by 
central government to stall the distribution of funds. The risk aversion of fund 
administrators was manifest not only in the slowness of the allocation process, but also in 
the type of project supported. At first, MAFF adopted a conservative interpretation of the 
conditions of funding, confining it to existing agricultural producers only, as previously 
that had been the condition of EAGGF guidance funds. This was because they had been 
predominantly concerned with fostering the adjustment of agricultural structures rather 
than rural development per se. 
 
A turning point in the funding process occurred in early 1998, following concern that the 
EAGGF funds might be reallocated to the ERDF section if they were not spent. A 
conference was held to assemble a think tank on how the money might be distributed, 
which was enthusiastically attended. Following this, money did flow more freely, but it is 
difficult to verify how relevant the conference was in spurring the change. Notably some 
very large projects won approval and some projects such as the pioneering „Devon Food 
Links‟ project which had struggled to be accepted as a qualifying project in the initial 
years, was offered more money than it had applied for.  
 
Significantly in the closing years of the programme, the use of „umbrella‟ projects 
became more prominent.  The precedent was set by the „South West Horticulture 2000‟ 
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scheme, which was an early applicant to the EAGGF. The project's purpose was to play 
an important coordinating and facilitating function for growers.  Later versions of 
umbrella projects placed more emphasis on delegated decision-making and grant 
awarding. An example was the Taste of the West's 'Capital Grant Scheme for Speciality 
Food Producers'. This was a partnership between the local Training and Enterprise 
Council and Taste of the West, a cooperative organisation devoted to the promotion of 
high-quality regional food and drink.  The project was granted funds that Taste of the 
West, as the main agent, administered on behalf of MAFF. Applicants were able to use a 
considerably simplified application process, with mentoring and encouragement provided 
throughout the process, and funding decisions were swift.  Warren et al (1999) 
commended the use of umbrella schemes, with the delegation of decisions to the lowest 
possible level of authority, and the consequent responsiveness and flexibility, while 
conforming to a broader framework of accountability (p70). 
 
While some flexibility in funding allocations occurred in the later stages of the Objective 
5b programme, nevertheless the targets set for each priority area were influential. This is 
apparent from the extent to which funding allocations mirrored the targets set for each 
priority area. Table 2 indicates that in June 1998, the allocation of funds very closely 
matched the plan.  Although perhaps an administrative success, doggedly sticking to plan 
is not necessarily the best use of the money. For example, should a weak agricultural 
project be a recipient at the expense of a good tourism scheme, just so that the SPD is 
adhered to? The case for strictly adhering to a plan would be greater if there was an 
expectation of synergy between the five priorities, but given the spatial expanse of the 
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Objective 5b designation, inter-project benefits were not likely to be considerable. The 
reason for keeping by the plan would seem to have been driven by the fact that those 
managing the administration of the funds did not perceive that they had the authority, at 
least in the early years, to deviate from it. However, by the end of the funding allocation 
period (31
st
 December 1999), there were some departures from the plan, specifically with 
a larger proportion of money than arranged going to agricultural projects, and less going 
to environment focused projects (see Table 2).    
 
Table 2: Planned allocation of EAGGF money (as a percentage) and number of 
projects approved according to priority by 3.6.98, and by the end of the application 
period on 10.1.00  
 
Priority EAGGF SPD 
planned 
allocation 
 
Allocation of 
monies by 
3.6.98 
Allocation of 
monies by 
10.01.00 
Number of 
projects 
supported by 
end of 
programme* 
Tourism 12.8% 13.7% 12.4% 10 
Agriculture 45.9% 45.9% 54.1% 92 
Community 
regeneration 
2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 7 
Environment 37.9% 36.8% 29.8% 34 
(Technical 
Assistance) 
1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 13 
 100%   156 
 
*Since several of the projects are „umbrella projects‟ the number of recipients is higher 
than indicated. 
 
4. Accountability requirements and the funding process  
 
The EAGGF funding of the Objective 5b area programme in the South West was a new 
experience, not only for MAFF but for the other players as well. The manner in which the 
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funds were allocated was inevitably a function of the organisations and people involved 
and the constraints within which they operated. Here focus is on the way accountability 
requirements acted as a norm enforcement mechanism on the funding process.   
 
The Objective 5b programme was creditable for attempting to steer away from policies 
that merely encouraged rationalisation within the agricultural industry, and was also an 
alternative to regional development programmes based on large infrastructure projects. 
Instead the EAGGF funding engaged local actors in a large number of mainly small-scale 
initiatives. To that extent it represents an endogenous approach to development. 
However, a deeper interpretation of endogenous development requires local people in the 
public, private and voluntary sectors to have greater control in determining what is best 
for themselves, independent of extra-local forces (see for example Ray, 2000). Within 
such an interpretation, the Objective 5b programme was not a fully endogenous process, 
with a significant degree of spending control held outside the locality. Although the 
accounting demands placed by the EU might be depicted as an attempt to wrest some 
power away from central governments of member states and to channel it down to the 
local level, nevertheless, the bureaucracy involved in ensuring this, coupled with member 
state procedures, often led local actors to feel they had little influence. The view of one 
South West regional partner was that the programme was largely a national matter within 
which other participants "did what they were told" (Roberts and Hart, 1997, p204).       
 
The disappointment expressed by both local actors and academic commentators with 
policies which seemingly tend towards an endogenous approach and to a change in 
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governance, but which in practice appear to cede too little power to the local level, are 
reflected in a dissatisfaction with accountability requirements. Edwards et al. (2001) 
explicitly identify accountability as a central issue in the way power is distributed and 
Ray (2000) elaborates with respect to evaluation procedures. A partnership approach to 
development might have been expected to provide a more socialised form of 
accountability, with local actors having a freer rein in allocating funds. However, 
permitting funding recipients to be the sole decision makers is akin to the grants being 
unconditional gift from richer regions of the European Union to the poorer. Given that 
this is currently not politically acceptable, then some hierarchical form of accountability 
seems inevitable. 
 
Nonetheless, even within a hierarchical approach of a principal and agent there is, 
according to Laughlin (1996), still the choice of contractual and communal forms of 
accountability. Implicitly, the accountability practices for Objective 5b have been 
criticised for being too contractual in nature. The degree to which they are of a 
contractual nature can be interpreted as indicating a lack of trust held by the financial 
donors, that the funding would be used in an appropriate manner. In the case of EAGGF 
funding a trust deficit seemed to exist at several levels; for example the EU did not trust 
all member states to implement an integrated planned programme of development, and so 
required a comprehensive planning document. At the local level there appeared to be a 
lack of trust in the fund applicants, and to try to redress the problem of asymmetric 
information there were high data requirements in making an application. Some of these 
problems are elaborated below before returning to a broader discussion of trust.      
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Fund administrators would appear to have been engaged in a juggling act, trying to be 
accountable to the EU demands, to national government ministers, responsive to clients, 
and responsive to their professional judgements. The data on the EAGGF funding in the 
South West Objective 5b area (see Table 2) suggest that at least for the first few years the 
fund administrators felt strictly bound to keeping to the funding allocations that were 
approved in the SPD. By June 1998 the distribution of funds between the 5 SPD 
categories mirrored the target allocation precisely. This exactitude could be considered 
merit worthy, if the initial appropriation of funds between the five categories had been 
based on sound evidence of need, and moreover from knowledge of potential synergies 
from such a distribution. But it is unlikely that sufficient information was available to 
determine the optimal distribution of funds between the categories a priori. Within such a 
light, the adherence to the plan can appear dirigiste and unlikely to be justifiable in terms 
of maximising the benefits from the total programme funding. This inflexibility may have 
resulted in less beneficial projects being adopted because they helped a category target to 
be reached, rather than being justifiable in terms of return on investment. Too little scope 
seems to have been given for adaptive planning as new information became available 
with the programme's progression.  
 
The SPD not only specified the required distribution of funds between categories, but also 
the expected number of jobs to be created as a result of the funding programme. Although 
the level of the job target was set through negotiations between all parties involved with 
the development of the SPD, it was the EU that determined that job creation was an 
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appropriate performance measure. For the FRCA people employed at the sharp end with 
responsibility for assessing applications, mainly from the private sector, the challenge 
was substantial. Targets for job creation were to be striven for, yet the agency had no 
control over the quality of the applicants and no effective control over the investment 
once the funding decision had been made. The success of a funded project was dependent 
upon its management by the fund applicant(s) and the parameters of the external 
environment, with the supporting funding bodies having little or no influence. In many 
public private partnerships, the private company may at least be bound by a legal contract 
and incentivised by the desire to have the contract renewed, but this was not so within the 
Objective 5b programme with grants to small businesses and other organisations. Thus 
with imperfect knowledge on whether a grant applicant will achieve its job target, and 
only the public sector bodies officially accountable, a proclivity towards caution by the 
funding agencies, as observed with EAGGF funds becomes understandable. Day and 
Klein (1987), found that within the public sector when the relationship between inputs 
and outputs is difficult to discern, there is a tendency for those involved with their 
provision to be more concerned with accounting for input (p232). Giving greater attention 
to ensuring that proper procedures are adhered to may be considered a judicious response, 
when guaranteeing output appears infeasible. This may explain some of the delay in 
processing EAGGF applications by FRCA/MAFF officials, in association with the fact 
that they lacked experience in determining market risk. By contrast the two government 
departments, the DTI and DoE, who administered the other two structural funds in the 
Objective 5b programme, had knowledge acquired from previous regeneration schemes. 
Furthermore, they were typically dealing with larger established clients, while MAFF 
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were having to assess more unproven entrepreneurial applicants who were unfamiliar 
with the funding process. The stress that this situation brought might explain why dealing 
with the application process with FRCA appeared adversarial to some applicants. 
Nonetheless it is likely that the procedures were a stumbling block to more effective 
distribution of the EAGGF funds. The frustration caused by long delays led to some 
potentially worthwhile projects being withdrawn and others beginning later than 
originally intended.  
 
The allocation of funding did speed up over the duration of the programme. While this 
might be explained by administrators becoming more experienced, and by a backlog of 
applications coming on stream, it is possible that pressure on administrators to ensure that 
all the funds were spent became a more dominant factor towards the end. The opportunity 
for political embarrassment if all the EU funding available were not spent
5
 could have 
resulted in concern for ensuring spending targets were met, overriding earlier concerns for 
procedural accountability. In several respects, therefore, it would appear that 
accountability requirements may have constrained the funding allocation and, while they 
may have prevented gross misuse of the funds, clearly their influence was not entirely 
beneficial to the process.  
 
Nonetheless, within the confines of existing arrangements, a route through some of the 
impediments to the effective distribution of funds was found with 'umbrella' project 
arrangements. These occurred when an established organisation such as Taste of the West 
or Devon County Council was delegated responsibility to allocate a sum of money to 
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small grant applicants for specific purposes. In some cases they also provided support to 
recipients, often in the form of developing marketing channels and networks. Reducing 
the effort required from small businesses in making an application is important for 
encouraging small-scale initiatives that are a vital component of endogenous rural 
development. Umbrella schemes were also valuable in extending the chain of 
accountability, first to the organisation administering the project, but more importantly to 
the receivers of the grant. This occurred simply because the recipient became part of a 
group, known to the grant awarding body, and known often to similar grant holders as 
well. Therefore there is a social setting within which the grant recipient is accountable, 
and in a sense is held to account in that misuse of funds may prejudice receipt of further 
help from the 'club'. Day and Klein (1987) have suggested, "it may be that informal social 
sanctions exercised in a face-to-face setting can be as strong (or possibly even stronger) 
than formal political and legal sanctions exercised in a larger context" (p247). Thus 
through this arrangement the risks involved to the funding agencies are reduced, because 
decisions are made with improved information, there is a support network which 
improves the chance of product success, and a degree of accountability is extended to the 
funding recipients.  This appeared to be a way of bridging some of the distance between 
donor and recipient of EU Structural Funds.  
 
The experience with umbrella arrangements emphasises the usefulness of networks in 
finding more effective means of implementing rural development programmes, already 
identified as important by Murdoch (2000). Umbrella schemes, by extending the line of 
accountability, spread the risk of funding allocations. This was consequential because, 
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when all the risk and responsibility lay with the state agencies, there were high levels of 
bureaucracy which impeded the swift and effective distribution of funds. Another value 
of the umbrella arrangements was that they helped to establish channels of 
communication between local entrepreneurs and the state, with the organisation 
distributing the funds able to articulate the general needs of a constituency. Such 
arrangements can encourage better dialogue and greater understanding between state and 
citizen. Nonetheless, it is necessary to be aware that if umbrella groups impose their own 
strategic template on what is funded through, for example, requiring specific 
memberships or imposing other unreasonable eligibility criteria, then the outcome may be 
sub-optimal. Indeed, Weber (1968) explained how exclusive social groups can 
monopolise goods and opportunities, and consequently argued that the impersonal order 
of hierarchical rules can offer forms of protection for the individual.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The accountability requirements for the Objective 5b programme caused difficulties in 
the allocation of EAGGF funds in the South West. The contractual accounting demands 
appear to lead to too much bureaucracy and conservatism, at least in its first three years of 
its operation. But the growth in more contractual forms of accountability within society 
has been a response to the increase in the specialisation of functions within economies. 
Interdependencies between people have become more complex and extended over larger 
social spaces (Elias, 1994, p448) and as a result people are less likely to personally know 
those with whom there lives are closely interlinked through the economic system. 
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Quantitative measures of performance and formalised assessment have come to be seen 
as necessary when principals and agents are unfamiliar with each other, for in such 
situations stocks of social capital are low and there is little or no trust. Furthermore, 
output targets are considered to have a key co-ordinating function when several 
organisations are involved in delivering a service. But a real strain experienced with 
contractual forms of accountability at the public policy level has been their implicit 
tendency to differentiate between policy and operations in cases where policy and its 
administration are not rigidly separable. Thomas (1998, p373) expresses precisely why 
this is a problem: "a great deal of policy making consists of diffuse, interactive processes 
of social learning in which modifications to existing policies and programs are made on 
the basis of administrative experience". Certainly for a rural development programme the 
way forward is not entirely clear at its beginning, its progress being dependent on the 
wants, actions and interactions of many people and organisations.  Thus contractual forms 
of accountability would seem less suitable than more flexible communal forms. 
Nevertheless for communal forms of accountability to be feasible, trust between 
individuals and organisations is required. But trust is not something that can be 
established by dictum, but grows from relational experience and reputation.  
 
The experience of distributing EAGGF Objective 5b funds in the South West illustrates 
that when a significantly different form of policy is introduced, it takes time for those 
involved to learn a new modus operandi. In addition, in the case of policies designed to 
encourage more endogenous processes of development, there is a need to develop 
networks and relationships. When principals and agents are unknown to each other then it 
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is unsurprising that there is wariness, particularly when the administrative body is more 
accountable to society than the recipients of the funds. The umbrella project arrangements 
under EAGGF funding illustrated a means by which accountability could be spread 
through the partnership and provide conducive conditions for trust to develop. Within a 
partnership, holding recipients to account can play a part in establishing trust., spreading 
risk and thereby freeing funds for novel projects.  
 
The South West of England experience demonstrates that even within the confines of its 
existing accountability structures the programme helped to develop networks through 
which channels of 'trust' could be established, paving the way for more flexible forms of 
accountability. In the Objective 5b programme, MAFF proved willing to relinquish some 
responsibility to umbrella organisations. An evolutionary perspective on policy 
development might suggest that state agencies may cede more control with the further 
development of trust and understanding. Nonetheless, there may always be a role for state 
agencies not only as facilitators but also to ensure equity. A balance is required between 
citizen involvement to inform and implement policy and state involvement to ensure that 
locally driven partnerships are not unfair on local people who happen to be excluded from 
their decision-making processes. This view is in line with Evans (1995) who makes the 
case for the state to have embedded autonomy. He suggests that it is necessary for the 
state to be integrated, embedded, within society and its economic activity in order to gain 
the required information to have appropriate policies. Yet at the same time the state needs 
to be autonomous with regard to guaranteeing even-handedness.  
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From our study of EAGGF Objective 5b funding in one region, it would appear that an 
initial problem with rural development partnerships is that because of a lack of a trusting 
relationship between state and citizens (and indeed between state and supra-national 
state), the accountability requirements have been too contractual. This has brought 
difficulties, as it can be hard to fulfil contractual requirements in an uncertain 
environment. Superimposed on this problem has been the fact that the requirements for 
accountability have been confined mainly to the state administrative bodies. An inevitable 
outcome of this has been their reluctance to take risks with funding. The development of 
networks provides a way in which accountability can be extended to other partners, 
creating the opportunity for more communal forms of accountability to become more 
acceptable. Moreover, they provide a way in which not only the risk associated with a 
new project is reduced, but also for the risk to be spread between partners, thus allowing 
less conservative projects to be funded.  
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Defining the appropriate accountability requirements for a rural development partnership 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can conclude that a rural development 
partnership is more likely to be effective in achieving novel and flexible development 
paths if the partners share the risk in the same way as business partners share risk. 
Accountability requirements are influential in determining where responsibility and risk 
falls. To spread risk it seems necessary to extend accountability requirements to all 
partners. Given that development is an explorative process, communal forms of 
accountability are more appropriate and for these to be acceptable greater familiarity and 
understanding between partners is required. Initial attempts at rural development 
partnerships have laid the foundations for this.        
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1
 The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was the government department responsible for the 
agricultural sector, preceding the establishment of the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA).  
 
2
 Some rural areas also became eligible for Community assistance if they lay within an Objective 1 region, 
designated where the average per capita GDP was less than 75% of the Community average. 
 
3
 In practice there may not be a sharp distinction between means and end. Within a learning environment, 
the means may be considered as an end.  
 
4
 This matches with the average for all UK Objective 5b areas. 
 
5
 This was particularly in view of the damaging effects of the BSE crisis on agriculture in the region. 
 
 
  
 
